Proto-thoughts on metaphysical transgressions in mathematics
I picked up a brief biography of Paul Erdos (pronounced Air-dish; it’s Hungarian) by Paul Hoffman, titled "The Man Who Loved Only Numbers." Not bad. It was free at Starbucks and caught my eye. Quite funny, actually, but that wasn’t its main value.
It played into my long-standing interest in the people who do mathematics. As pro-individual as I am, it’s hard to deny that as a group, mathematicians are less mentally well than normal, more frequently than normal. And here I’m not talking about being wierd, or socially mal-adjusted per se, or even nervous ticks and twitches and strange habits and whatnot. Mental health, not social adjustment (though there are some minor lines of attachment between the two). I mean whether or not one feels happiness, self-worth, self-fulfilment, pride, and has a firm grasp of reality and what it takes to survive.
I think it’s quite possible that scientists more constrained by technology are better able to compartmentalize their minds, such that wacky personal beliefs don’t impact their work as directly, as quickly, as severely. (I’m against compartmentalization, by the way). There is no such convenient barrier in much of pure math. Thus, whether one believes in the boogy-man or not is likelier to affect your math. Philosophy matters.
Many people consider math a science. It appears to be almost entirely deductive, beyond initial, tantalizing observations of patterns, quirks, or problems. Unlike more material-based scientists, however, mathematicians as a group seem to be prone to mysticism, depression, anxiety, and paranoia of varying degrees. I’ve seen this first-hand in people who aren’t legendary, so I have reason to think the problem isn’t confined to the people who have books written about them. In my view (which still qualifies as a glorified hunch at this point) this mysticism, in its countless forms, is in turn representative of fundamental intellectual transgressions. When you’re that smart, mere oversights or assumptions or unquestioned beliefs are tantamount to intellectual transgressions, in my book. Disagree as you see fit.
Furthermore, these transgressions tend to spur on additional transgressions, and being so fundamental, they also tear at one’s perception of the very basis of reality. This is not good. A strong grasp of, and confidence in, one’s place in reality is, in my experience, essential to mental well-being. Feeling/believing/knowing that one is capable of successfully navigating reality is also essential. No doubt there are other factors that contribute to the apparently disproportionate rates of mental illness among mathematicians. I’m just saying that bad philosophy can play a significant role as well. Chicken or egg, I don’t know. I bet it’s a mixed bag.
But, I’m very much in the information collection stage. Here’s some of the information I gained, albeit second-hand, from this book.
pg. 45. "Pythagoras certainly had his eccentriciites - he was a vegetarian who refused to eat beans because they reminded him of testicles - but he got mathematics off to a solid footing by championing the concept of proof. He also had an uncanny feel for individual numbers. He considered 220 and 284 to be friendly. His notion of a "friendly" number was based on the idea that a human friend is a kind of alter ego. Pythagoras wrote, "[A friend] is the other I, such as are 220 and 284." These numbers have a special mathematical property: each is equal to the sum of the other’s proper divisors. …
"A second pair of friendly numbers (17,296 and 18,416 was not discovered until 1636 by Pierre de Fermat. …
pg. 46: "Pythagoras saw perfection in any integer that equaled the sum of all the other integers that divided evenly into it. The first perfect number is 6. It’s evenly divisible by 1, 2 and 3, and it’s also the sum of 1, 2, and 3. The second perfect number is 28. Its divisors are 1, 2, 4, 7 and 14, and they add up to 28. During the Middle Ages, religious scholars asserted that the perfection of 6 and 28 was part of the fabric of the universe: God created the world in six days and the Moon orbits the Earth every twenty-eight days. St. Augustine believed that the properties of the numbers themselves, not any connection to the empirical world, made them perfect: "Six is a number perfect in itself, and not because God created all things in six days; rather that the inverse is true; God created all things in six days because this number is perfect. And it would remain perfect even if the work of the six days did not exist."
I’d be interested to read some Frege first-hand. From the description in this book of some of his work (which I suspect is accurate, if highly simplified, simply because the author knew enough mathematicians who could proof the book), he tripped over the problem of universals and fell flat on his face. Check out this attempt at a definition:
pg. 111: "Work on the foundations of mathematics was all the rage at the turn of the [20th] century. Mathematical logicians like Frege and Russell were trying to build up all of mathematics in a completely rigorous way. The idea was to take nothing for granted, to prove everything from first principles, to deduce all of mathematics from as few self-evident axions as possible. In building up elementary arithmetic, for example, they started with axioms like the so-called commutative law of addition [a+b=b+a]… That they even othered to state such self-evident propositions was a testament to their rigorous approach. But they went further, spelling out the definitions of individual numbers like the number 4 rather than taking such definitions for granted. In this formal way of thinking, numbers were defined in terms of sets. What, for example, is the number 4? Look around you, said Frege, and you’ll see fours everywhere. There’s the set of suits in a deck of cards and the set of legs on a chair. Take all the sets with four members and put them together in one big set - this set of sets constitutes the concept of "fourness.""
Or you could drink poison for breakfast every day. Good grief.
pg. 109: "Erdos saw it as his personal mission to help colleagues maintain their mathematical edge. When they fell ill, as [Stanislaw] Ulam did, he challenged their minds back to health. Not all recoveries were as successful as Ulam’s. Some of his ill colleagues regained their mathematical ability but, trangically, not their confidence. Jon Folkman was a brilliant young mathematician who worked at Rand, the think tank in Santa Monica. He was diagnosed with a brain tumor in the late 1960s. Evidently it had grown to such a large size that the prognosis for surgery wasn’t good. His doctors felt that there was little chance they could remove it; or, if they could, he might become a vegetable. But against the odds the operation was successful. "Erdos and I visited him in the hospital afterwards," said [Ronald Graham]. "No sooner had we entered the hospital room when Erdos started challenging Jon with math problems. He had just come out of brain surgery and he was able to solve the problems! Sure, he was answering a little slowly but he was answering. After he went home, though, his personality changed from before the procedure. He was a little moodier and he believed he was losing his skills. The evidence, though, was that his mathematical ability was better than ever. To test himself, he’d look through all the open problems in conference proceedings and solve them sequentially one by one. That’s incredible! Jon, like Gauss, had such high standards he never published some of his very good work. One day he bought a gun and shot himself. He was thirty-one. It was all very sad. His boss at Rand, D. Ray Fulkerson, blamed himself for not recognizing the depths of his troubles and doing someing. ‘Jon’s suicide is often on my mind,’ Fulkerson said. Later Fulkerson killed himself too.""
pg. 110: "The Austrian logician Kurt Godel was one of the mathematical giants who lost his confidence, and Erdos tried to help him get it back. Erdos met Godel at the Institute for Advanced Study, the logician’s principal home from 1933 until 1976. "Godel I talked with a great deal," said Erdos. "He was certainly a remarkable intellect. He understood everything, even what he didn’t work [on]. It is strange how little he published. He could certainly have done more things. I always argued with him" because his interests drifted toward metaphysics. "We studied Leibniz a great deal and I told him, ‘You became a mathematician so that people should study you, not that you should study Leibniz.’"
On Godel and his work on the foundations of mathematics:
pg. 111: "In 1931, back in Vienna, the twenty-five-year-old Godel stunned the scientific community by tearing asunder the very foundations of mathematics. He had managed to prove that any formal mathematical system robust enough to include the laws of arithmetic would be unable to prove its own consistency. His innocently titled paper, "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems," skewered Russell’s work on the foundations of mathematics [by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead]."
Russell’s paradox:
pg. 116 (quoting Russell): Thinking about the paradoxical Cretan* led Russell to the idea ‘that a class sometimes is, and sometimes is not, a member of itself. The class of teaspoons, for example, is not another teaspoon, but the class of things that are not teaspoons is one of the things that are not teaspoons. There seemed to be instances which are not negative: for example, the class of all classes is a class. … [This] led me to consider the classes that are not members of themselves; and these, it seemed, must form a class. I asked myself whether this class is a member of itself or not. If it is a member of itself, it must possess the defining property of the class, which is to be not a member of itself. If it is not a member of itself, it must not possess the defining property of the class, and therefore must be a member of itself. Thus each alternative leads to its opposite and there is a contradiction.’"
*an ancient Greek contradiction about Epimenides the Cretan, who said that all Cretans are liars.
In English, for those of you who have better things to do than figure out the details of a convoluted presentation of a false paradox:
"A few years later, Russell came up with a popularized version of his paradox. Imagine the Barber of Seville who shaves every man who does not shave himself. Does the Barber of Seville shave himself? If he does, he doesn’t, and if he doesn’t, he does. Try as Frege did, [who Russell and his paradox skewered], he could not circumvent Russell’s cunning conundrum about the class of all classes."
On to Godel, who in turn skewered Russell and Whitehead:
"Godel demonstrated that no complex mathematical system was complete. In other words, no matter what axioms are chosen, meaningful mathematical statements can be made whose truth or falseness can never be demonstrated within the system. … Godel’s second discovery was even more devastating. He demonstrated that it was impossible to prove that any given complex mathematical system was consistent. In other words, you can never be sure that the set of axioms won’t lead to a contradiction. On the Richter scale of mathematical discoveries, Godel’s was a 10. That mathematics was incomplete and possibly inconsistent was a body blow to those who saw mathematics as the most logical of logical systems, and few in the field didn’t see it that way. In the wake of Godel, most card-carrying mathematicians still clung to the belief that mathematics was in fact free of contradictions, even though they now knew they could never prove this. As Andre Weil, number theorist extraordinaire, put it: "God exists since mathematics is consistent, and the Devil exists since we cannot prove it.""
pg. 118: "Genius though he was, Godel was not a poster boy for mathematical sanity. Obsessed with ghosts and demons and an imagined heart ailment, he checked himself in and out of sanitariums many times in his adult life for treatment of depression and acute anxiety. He was always a finicky eater, but as he got older he ate less and less, refusing to take food from anyone but his wife Adele, fearing that other people were secretly trying to poison him. At sixty-four he weighed only eighty-six pounds. In the middle of 1977, when Adele was hospitalized for major surgery, he stopped eating altogether, and by the following January starved himself to death at the age of seventy-one. In his dying days he had serious doubts that his life’s work amounted to anything more than the discovery of another silly paradox a la Barber of Seville."
Shall we say it together? "Check your premises."
pg. 126: "Ernst Straus [a mathematician and an assistant for four years to Einstein] was one of the few people who had the opportunity to observe firsthand the differences in style between the master physicist and the master mathematician. In a tribute to Erdos on his seventieth birthday, Straus said" "Einstein often told me that the reason he chose physics over mathematics was that mathematics is so full of beautiful and attractive questions that one might easily waste one’s powers in pursing them without finding the central questions. In physics he had the ‘nose’ for the central questions and he felt that it was the chief duty of the scientist to pursue those questions and not let himself be seduced by any problem - no matter how difficult or attractive it might be. Erdos has consistently and successfully violated every one of Einstein’s prescriptions. He has succumbed to the seduction of every beautiful problem he has encountered - and a great number have succumbed to him. This just proves to me that in the search for truth there is room for Don Juans like Erdos and Sir Galahads like Einstein."


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